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Five Principles for Vertical Merger
Enforcement Policy
B Y J O N A T H A N B . B A K E R , N A N C Y L . R O S E , S T E V E N C . S A L O P, A N D F I O N A S C O T T M O R T O N

V

ERTICAL MERGERS HAVE BECOME
increasingly prominent and controversial in
antitrust policy-making. There seems to be
consensus that the Department of Justice’s
1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines,1 now 35
years old, reflect neither modern theoretical and empirical
economic analysis nor current agency enforcement policy.2
There is little dispute that antitrust enforcement should be
based on rigorous economic analysis.3 However, widely divergent views of preferred enforcement policies were expressed
by the Federal Trade Commission Commissioners when
resolving Staples’s acquisition of Essendant 4 and Fresenius’s
acquisition of NxStage,5 by Commissioner Wilson in a recent
speech,6 by the various amicus briefs filed in connection
with the appeal of the Justice Department’s unsuccessful
challenge to AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner, 7 by
Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim,8 and by the
participants at the FTC’s competition policy hearing on vertical mergers.9 This broad range of views suggests the difficulty that the FTC Commissioners will face in reaching consensus on vertical mergers in any potential FTC hearings
report and the problem that the two enforcement agencies
will face in formulating new vertical merger guidelines. It also
creates difficulties for practitioners when counseling clients or
advocating in favor of, or in opposition to, proposed vertical
transactions.
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in United States v. AT&T
offered some guidance but did not suggest that courts should
apply different legal standards to vertical mergers than to
horizontal mergers.10 It observed that under Section 7 of the
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Clayton Act, “the government must show that the proposed
merger is likely to substantially lessen competition, which
encompasses a concept of ‘reasonable probability’” and accepted that the modern burden-shifting approach to evaluating
merger challenges, developed in horizontal merger cases,
applied to all cases brought under Section 7.11 As a result, the
court left substantial gaps that the agencies and the courts will
need to fill.
To assist the enforcement agencies in navigating these
choppy waters, we have briefly set forth our views on critical economic analysis and process issues regarding vertical
merger enforcement policy. In doing so, we assume that the
agencies will base their enforcement on the burden-shifting
analysis of mergers set forth by the D.C. Circuit in AT&T,
Baker Hughes, and Heinz (without invoking the Philadelphia
National Bank 12 horizontal merger structural presumption).
A similar burden-shifting framework is applied to analyze
claims brought under both Section 1 and Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.
Based on our review of the economic literature on vertical integration and our experience in analyzing vertical mergers, we recommend that the agencies adopt the following
five principles to guide vertical merger enforcement:
䡲 Consider and investigate the full range of potential anticompetitive harms.
䡲 Decline to presume that vertical mergers benefit competition in the oligopoly markets that typically prompt
agency review, nor set a higher evidentiary standard based
on such a presumption.
䡲 Evaluate claimed efficiencies as carefully and critically as
they evaluate those resulting from horizontal mergers,
including requiring the merging parties to show that the
efficiencies are verifiable, merger-specific, and sufficient to
reverse the potential anticompetitive effects.
䡲 Decline to adopt a safe harbor for vertical mergers, even
if rebuttable, except perhaps when both firms compete in
unconcentrated markets.
䡲 Consider adopting rebuttable presumptions that a vertical
merger harms competition when certain factual predicates (as indicated below) are satisfied.
Vertical mergers raise a number of other important policy questions that we do not discuss here, though one of us has
addressed those issues extensively elsewhere.13

Approaches to Vertical Merger Enforcement
We next explain the rationale for these principles in more
detail. Our overall concern is to reduce false negatives (including under-deterrence), while keeping false positives
(including over-deterrence) low. Our analysis focuses on oligopoly markets where vertical mergers are most likely to raise
concerns. We note that these may include digital markets—
markets for services produced and consumed online—which
are increasing in significance in the economy with the growth
of information technology. In such markets, production
economies of scale and network effects can create oligopoly
structures and entry barriers, leading to the exercise of market power. That possibility raises the competitive concerns
from vertical mergers.
Consider and Investigate the Full Range of Potential
Competitive Harms. Enforcers should evaluate the full
range of potential competitive harms when investigating vertical mergers. These harms can lead to higher prices, as well
as reduced quality and innovation.14 We encourage the agencies to commit themselves to investigating all such harms.
The agencies should also evaluate the full range of potential
competitive benefits too, but this proposition is widely
accepted.
Economic analysis—both economic theory15 and empirical studies16—and merger enforcement 17 have identified a
number of ways by which vertical mergers can harm competition. Such harms include input foreclosure or customer foreclosure, and the creation of two-level entry barriers. “Foreclosure” is broadly defined. For example, input foreclosure
includes price increases, cost increases, and other disadvantages
placed on downstream rivals, not just total denial of the relevant input.18 We also note that “input foreclosure” would
describe foreclosure after a manufacturer acquires a distributor, because the distribution services provided by a distributor are an input into the sale of the product.19 Competitive
harms from foreclosure can occur from the merged firm exercising its increased bargaining leverage to raise rivals’ costs or
reduce rivals’ access to the market.20 Vertical mergers also can
facilitate coordination by eliminating a disruptive or “maverick” competitor at one vertical level, or through information
exchange.21 Vertical mergers also can eliminate potential competition between the merging parties. In addition, regulated
firms can use vertical integration to evade rate regulation.
These competitive harms normally occur when at least one of
the markets has an oligopoly structure. They can lead to higher prices, lower output, quality reductions, and reduced investment and innovation.22
Economic analysis and merger enforcement also have
identified a number of ways by which vertical mergers can
lead to efficiency benefits that can increase competition.23
These benefits can include lower costs or higher quality products resulting from better integration in design or production,
which can be achieved by economies of scope or better communication between the parties. By aligning incentives and
preventing ex post holdup, investment and innovation incen-

tives also might increase. Efficiency benefits also can include
elimination of double marginalization (EDM) when the
merged company sets the internal transfer price and the
downstream price with a focus on joint profits instead of simply the profits of the separate businesses.24 These competitive
benefits can mitigate or prevent competitive harms if they are
sufficient in magnitude.
Do Not Presume that Mergers in Oligopoly Markets
Benefit Competition. Some commentators have proposed
that antitrust enforcement treat vertical mergers more permissively than horizontal mergers, even in concentrated markets.25 Doing so would be tantamount to presuming that
vertical mergers benefit competition regardless of market
structure. However, such a presumption is not warranted for
vertical mergers in the oligopoly markets that typically
prompt enforcement agency review. Neither economic theory nor empirical evidence supports it. Moreover, the adoption of such a presumption would permit anticompetitive
vertical mergers, which then would empirically invalidate
the presumption. At best, one might say that vertical mergers are unlikely to harm competition if both markets are
unconcentrated. However, anticompetitive effects are possible when one market is unconcentrated, or even when both
are, for reasons discussed later.
1. ECONOMIC THEORY. The argument that vertical merger enforcement should be very light-handed has two parts.
The first is the view that vertical mergers are somehow inherently less likely to harm competition than horizontal mergers because the latter result in the loss of a horizontal rival,
which tends to lead to price increases.26 For example, Robert
Bork argued that vertical mergers merely rearrange buyer/
seller relationships, and he criticized an FTC case with his
famous remark that the FTC should have hosted an “industry social mixer” instead of challenging the merger.27 But the
claim that vertical mergers are inherently unlikely to raise
horizontal concerns fails to recognize that all theories of harm
from vertical mergers posit a horizontal interaction that is the
ultimate source of harm. Vertical mergers create an inherent
exclusionary incentive as well as the potential for coordinated effects similar to those that occur in horizontal mergers.28
The inherent exclusionary incentive can be explained with
an example involving input foreclosure.29 Suppose that only
two upstream suppliers compete to supply a critical input to
several modestly-sized downstream firms. Suppose that these
downstream firms compete with a larger downstream firm
that also acquires inputs from these suppliers. The low input
prices resulting from the upstream competition leads to
greater downstream competition.
However, suppose next that one of the two upstream suppliers merges with the leading downstream firm. This merger inherently will reduce competition upstream and downstream. In the upstream market, the merged upstream supplier
would gain the incentive to raise the price it charges for its
input to the smaller buyers that it does not own.30 As a result
of these input price increases, the smaller downstream firms
S U M M E R
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There is no fundamental difference in incentives to
har m competition between horizontal and ver tical
merger s that would justify a presumption that
ver tical merger s in oligopoly mar kets are unlikely
to har m competition, but not a similar presumption
for horizontal ones.

would suffer higher costs. These higher costs in turn would
induce the smaller downstream firms to compete less aggressively, reducing downstream competition overall. In particular, the smaller downstream firms would have an incentive to
pass on their higher costs by raising their prices, which would
permit the downstream merging firm to raise its price. In
effect, the vertical merger would lead to involuntary pricing
cooperation between the disadvantaged downstream firms
and the downstream merging firm, leading to higher downstream prices.31
It might be argued that this input foreclosure strategy
would be unprofitable because the upstream merging firm
would lose too many customers among the downstream rivals
to the competing upstream supplier. It is the case that if the
merged firm’s upstream affiliate raises its prices, the downstream rivals it sells to would have an incentive to look for
another supplier. However, as the only alternative input supplier, the competing input supplier normally would have an
incentive to raise its own price in response, that is, to accommodate the price increase by the merged firm’s upstream
affiliate.32 It might not fully match the price increase, but it
would be expected to accommodate it, at least partially. In
conventional unilateral effects analysis, for example, a price
increase by one differentiated products competitor typically
leads the producers of differentiated substitutes also to raise
their prices. Thus, the competing supplier would not be
expected to prevent upstream prices from rising altogether. In
addition, the incentive of the competing supplier to raise its
prices would be exacerbated if some of the downstream firms
are unwilling to purchase from the merged firm after the
merger out of a fear that their confidential information will
be shared with its downstream affiliate.33 These input price
increases in turn make harm to the customers of the downstream firms more likely. If rivals’ costs increase, downstream
prices may increase from the downstream merging firm gaining power to raise prices.
The lesson of this example is that vertical mergers give the
merged firm an inherent incentive to foreclose rivals at one
vertical level (downstream in the example), at least when the
market at the other vertical level (upstream in the example)
has a structure that would give the competing input suppliers the incentive to at least partially accommodate the price
1 4
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increase by the merged firm. There is no fundamental difference in incentives to harm competition between horizontal and vertical mergers that would justify a presumption
that vertical mergers in oligopoly markets are unlikely to
harm competition, but not a similar presumption for horizontal ones. A horizontal merger among differentiated product firms in an oligopoly market has a normal tendency to
raise prices. The same is true after a vertical merger in an oligopoly input market for a critical input, where the upstream
merging firm is a substantial competitor. But, just as the
inherent incentive after a vertical merger to increase the input
price charged by the merged firm’s upstream affiliate turns on
market structure, so does the inherent incentive to raise price
after a horizontal merger.34
Vertical mergers also raise coordinated effects concerns
similar to those that can occur in horizontal mergers. Vertical
mergers can eliminate sell-side mavericks or disruptive buyers. In addition, unlike strictly horizontal mergers, vertical
mergers also can lead to anticompetitive information transfers from rivals to the merging firm. These information transfers can facilitate collusive information exchanges.35
The inherent exclusionary incentive created by vertical
mergers combined with their ability to generate adverse coordinated effects means that enforcers should not presume that
vertical mergers in oligopoly markets cannot harm competition.36 For the same reason, enforcers also should not set a
higher evidentiary standard for finding anticompetitive harms
from a vertical merger than it applies when reviewing horizontal deals.
2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE. As with economic theory, the
empirical evidence does not justify presuming that vertical
mergers in oligopoly markets benefit competition. Surveys of
earlier economic studies, relied upon by commenters who
propose a procompetitive presumption, reference studies of
vertical mergers in which the researchers sometimes identified
competitive harm and sometimes did not.37 However, recent
empirical work using the most advanced empirical toolkit
often finds evidence of anticompetitive effects.38 While vertical restraints, as distinct from vertical mergers, also can lead
to efficiencies, they too can harm competition.39
It is inappropriate to base a presumption that vertical
mergers are unlikely to harm competition on the examples
collected in these earlier surveys. Some of the cited studies
involve vertical integration (whether by explicit merger or
contract) in competitive markets where a challenge would
have been unlikely. Yet it is not possible to draw conclusions
about the interbrand competitive effects of vertical mergers
in oligopoly markets from studies of the consequences of a
variety of vertical restraints and integration in competitive
markets. Similarly, some studies involved the impact of
divestitures required by state action for non-antitrust concerns, so they were less likely to show any impact of eliminating anticompetitive conduct. Other studies analyzed the
impact of intrabrand restraints that might not have raised
interbrand competition concerns.

Moreover, some studies were not constructed to distinguish between cost-raising and elimination of double marginalization effects. For example, studies that compare the relative prices or shares of the downstream merging firm and its
rivals, and stock market event studies that examine the impact
of a merger on the stock price of a competitor of the merging firm, cannot distinguish between the effects of EDM
and foreclosure.40 The cited studies also disproportionately
focus on a narrow set of industries (e.g., cable, beer), which
may not be representative.
The surveyed studies also suffer from another selection
bias. Studies of the competitive effects of vertical integration
will be systematically biased in favor of finding procompetitive benefits when firms behave in the shadow of antitrust
law.41 To isolate the overall competitive consequences of conduct, it is necessary to compare how that conduct affects
competition with and without antitrust restraints, which the
surveyed studies do not do. For example, in their study of
resale price maintenance, MacKay and Smith avoid this selection bias by comparing outcomes in states with and without
Leegin-repealer statutes.42
A concern about selection bias also can arise in studying
the competitive impact of specific vertical mergers that were
cleared by the agencies. Thus, the fraction of mergers that are
found to be anticompetitive understates the rate of false negatives that would occur if enforcement were relaxed. Studies
of the competitive effects of vertical integration are also systematically biased in favor of procompetitive benefits to the
extent researchers depend on cooperation from the merging
firms to obtain data.
Carefully Evaluate Merging Firms’ Efficiency Claims.
The other part of the argument that vertical merger enforcement should be very light-handed is a claim that vertical
mergers are inherently efficient, even if markets are highly
concentrated.43 Vertical mergers certainly can create efficiency benefits, just as horizontal mergers can. But such efficiencies are not necessarily merger-specific. Nor are they
always sufficient to reverse the competitive harm. Moreover,
a careful merger review should analyze whether these criteria
are satisfied.
Claimed efficiencies must be substantiated so they can be
verified, merger-specific, and not the product of an anticompetitive reduction in output or service. These cognizability criteria are just as important when analyzing claimed
efficiencies from a vertical merger as they are for evaluating
the claimed efficiencies from a horizontal merger—and they
should be applied to evaluate those claims with equally close
scrutiny.44 Efficiencies must also be sufficient to reverse any
competitive harms. That is, pass-through of claimed efficiencies should be required in the analysis of vertical mergers to the same extent it is required in the analysis of horizontal mergers.
A careful analysis, rather than a presumption, also should
be applied to efficiency claims involving the elimination of
double marginalization. EDM often may occur from a ver-

tical merger, but it is not an inevitable result. EDM already
might have been achieved before the merger through bargaining that leads to multi-part tariffs, take-or-pay contracts,
or other contractual provisions. A merger also will not generate EDM efficiencies if the downstream merging partner
does not use the input produced by the upstream merging
firm, for example because of incompatible technology. A
recent study found that there are no inter-firm input transfers in almost half of the vertically integrated firms.45 In addition, EDM benefits may be limited because the integrated
firm will take into account the fact that diversion of inputs
from the merging firm’s upstream affiliate to its downstream
affiliate will sacrifice some profitable input sales by the
upstream firm to downstream third parties that compete
with the merged firm’s downstream affiliate.46 This recognition limits the degree to which EDM leads the merging firm
to lower its inter-firm input transfer prices or downstream
prices. These possibilities make it essential that the magnitude
of likely EDM be substantiated and verified.
Because EDM might be eliminated through negotiation of
vertical contracts between independent firms, EDM should
also be tested for merger-specificity;47 merger specificity
should not simply be assumed without analysis. Even if the
upstream firm sells its input to the downstream merging firm
at a pre-merger price that exceeds marginal cost, that fact by
itself does not prove that the efficiency is merger-specific.
Even in the absence of formal two-part pricing schedules,
contracts with quantity steps or minimums, or negotiations
that explicitly or implicitly reward volume expansion, may
substantially limit or completely eliminate double marginalization. For example, consider a patent license that sets a positive running royalty, but with a contractual purchase minimum that exceeds the likely purchases. In that situation, the
effective marginal price is zero.
If in advance of the merger the parties never considered
contracting to eliminate double marginalization, that fact
may suggest that EDM would not achieve substantial benefits. If the parties tried and failed to negotiate a contract, it
would be important to understand why the negotiation failed
in order to determine whether the explanation is credible, as
well as to determine whether double marginalization likely
would be eliminated through a vertical merger.48 A general
claim that there were “bargaining frictions” is an inadequate
explanation, just as it would not be considered sufficient evidence of merger-specificity in horizontal merger cases.49 After
all, the parties apparently were able to overcome bargaining
frictions in successfully negotiating the merger agreement,
and input prices are commonly negotiated between large
firms. To mirror Robert Bork’s famous remark about vertical restraints,50 if the parties’ only reason for failing to achieve
EDM is bargaining frictions, the Commission would do better by introducing the parties to a top-notch mediator or arbitrator rather than permitting an otherwise potentially anticompetitive merger.51
S U M M E R
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Do Not Adopt a Safe Harbor Except Perhaps When
Both Firms Compete in Unconcentrated Markets. The
agencies should decline to adopt a safe harbor for vertical
mergers, except perhaps when both firms compete in unconcentrated markets.52 Vertical mergers involving firms in at
least one oligopoly market raise the greatest competitive concerns. If both markets are unconcentrated, it is less likely that
a vertical merger would be anticompetitive.
If even one of the markets is unconcentrated, however, a
safe harbor would not be appropriate. For example, if the
input market is concentrated, profitable input foreclosure
does not require that the downstream market also be concentrated. Input foreclosure that raises the cost of all or most
of the competitors in an unconcentrated downstream market could cause substantial diversion to the merged firm’s
downstream affiliate, making the input foreclosure profitable
and leading to higher downstream prices.53 In addition, the
coordinated effects from eliminating an upstream maverick
would not require the downstream market to be concentrated, and concentration upstream would make it more
likely that a maverick would constrain coordination in that
market. Similarly, a disruptive buyer in an unconcentrated
downstream market might constrain coordination in a concentrated upstream market—in which case its acquisition by
an upstream firm could make coordination more effective.
Consider Adopting Anticompetitive Presumptions
When Certain Conditions Are Met. The agencies should
consider adopting rebuttable presumptions that a vertical
merger harms competition when certain factual predicates are
satisfied. We set out several possible presumptions here that
could be invoked when at least one of the markets is concentrated, and thus, when competitive harm is more likely.54
In each case, the factual predicates aim to identify vertical
mergers that are more likely to harm competition, so we
would expect adoption of the presumption to enhance deterrence of anticompetitive conduct while reducing the costs of
investigating and litigating vertical mergers and the costs
associated with uncertainty about regulatory outcomes. By
invoking a presumption, the plaintiff would satisfy its prima
facie case, thereby shifting the burden of production to the
merging firms.
We also emphasize that we do not intend these presumptions to describe all the ways by which vertical mergers can
harm competition. These presumptions set out conditions
where concerns are greatest. They identify narrow factual
settings where competitive harm is particularly likely, and
thus, where it is appropriate to presume anticompetitive
harm. The agencies should continue to investigate vertical
mergers that raise competitive concerns—including concerns
about input and customer foreclosure, loss of a disruptive or
maverick firm, or evasion of rate regulation––even if the specific factual predicates set forth in the following presumptions
are not satisfied.
䡲 Input foreclosure presumption: 55 If the upstream merging
firm in a concentrated market is a substantial supplier of a
1 6
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䡲

䡲

䡲

䡲

䡲

critical input to the competitors of the other merging firm
and a hypothetical 56 decision to stop dealing with those
downstream competitors would lead to substantial diversion of business to the downstream merging firm. In this
situation, a vertical merger can raise the costs of the unintegrated rivals and permit the merged firm to exercise market power in the downstream market. In this regard, it is
important to emphasize that distributors provide an input
(i.e., distribution services) to manufacturers, (as well as
that manufacturers provide an input (i.e., the manufactured good) to distributors).57
Customer foreclosure presumption:58 If the downstream
merging firm is a substantial purchaser of the input produced in a concentrated upstream market, and a decision
to stop dealing with the competitors of the upstream
merging firms would lead to the exit, marginalization, or
significantly higher variable costs of one or more of those
competitors by diverting a substantial amount of business away from them. In this situation, a vertical merger
can reduce competition in the upstream market and permit the merged firm to exercise market power.59
Elimination of potential entry presumption: If either (or
both) of the merging firms has a substantial probability of
entering into the other firm’s concentrated market absent
the merger. In this situation, the merger would eliminate
the possibility that entry (or the fear of that entry if the
incumbent firm charges excessive prices) would make the
market more competitive.
Disruptive or maverick seller presumption: If the upstream
merging firm in a concentrated input market supplies the
product purchased by competitors of the other merging
firm, and by its conduct has prevented or substantially
constrained coordination in the upstream market. In this
situation, the constraining influence of the disruptive or
maverick firm could be eliminated, leading to higher market prices.
Disruptive or maverick buyer presumption: If the downstream merging firm purchases the product sold by the
other merging firm or its competitors, and by its conduct
has prevented or substantially constrained coordination in
the sale of that product by the other merging firm and its
competitors in a concentrated input market. In this situation, the constraining influence of the disruptive or maverick firm could be eliminated, leading to higher market
prices.
Evasion of regulation presumption: If the downstream firm’s
maximum price is regulated, competition nonetheless may
be harmed from a vertical merger. This can occur, for
example, if the regulation permits the downstream firm to
raise its price in response to cost increases. The regulated
downstream firm could raise the price of the input supplied to it by its upstream merger partner, increasing
upstream profits and downstream prices. Evasion of regulation could also occur if the merger involves firms that
sell complementary products. The newly merged firm

could raise the price of the bundle and attribute the price
increase to the unregulated product.
䡲 Dominant platform presumption: If a dominant platform
acquires a firm with a substantial probability of entering
in competition with it absent the merger, or if that dominant platform company acquires a competitor in an
adjacent market. Rivals in vertically adjacent or complementary markets are often potential entrants, so this presumption reaches nascent threats to competition created
by eliminating the potential entrants through the merger.
The presumption also recognizes that a dominant platform’s market power would give it the ability to substantially disadvantage firms in adjacent markets by choosing
not to interoperate, which can raise foreclosure concerns.
This presumption can be understood as an application of
the elimination of potential entry presumption and an
input or customer foreclosure presumption in a setting
where network effects and economies of scale would be
expected to raise barriers to entry, and thus endow a dominant platform with substantial market power.
None of these presumptions is purely structural in the
sense of being based solely on market shares and concentration. The dominant platform presumption that would apply to
a vertical merger if at least one of the merging firms is a
dominant platform would be the closest.
All of these anticompetitive presumptions would be rebuttable, so they would not create per se prohibitions of vertical
mergers. If the agencies adopt any or all of the presumptions,
they should allow them to be rebutted by evidence showing
that anticompetitive effects are unlikely. In the case of the
input foreclosure presumption, for example, this could
include evidence that the input was not critical, that substantial input market competition (including entry competition) would protect the targeted downstream rivals from
cost increases, that sufficient downstream competition by
non-targeted firms would prevent downstream price increases and consumer harm, that the expected margin and diver-

1

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1984), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/05/18/2614.pdf.

2

See, e.g., D. Bruce Hoffman, Acting Director, Bureau of Competition, Fed.
Trade Comm’n, Vertical Merger Enforcement at the FTC 4 n.9 (Jan. 10,
2018), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
1304213/hoffman_vertical_merger_speech_final.pdf.

3

The importance of rigorous economic analysis is a different question from
whether antitrust should recognize non-economic goals, such as preventing
threats to the political process from corporate giants or protecting access
to the market by small business, along with economic ones, such as the
familiar concern to protect consumer (trading partner) welfare.

4

Staples, Inc., FTC No. 181-0180 (Jan. 28, 2019) (Statement of Chairman
Joseph J. Simons, Comm’r Noah Joshua Phillips, and Comm’r Christine S.
Wilson) [hereinafter Staples Majority Statement]; Staples, Inc., FTC No.
181- 0180 (Jan. 28, 2019) (Statement of Comm’r Christine S. Wilson)
[hereinafter Commissioner Wilson Staples Statement]; Staples, Inc., FTC No.

sion ratio to the downstream merging firm would be very
low, that sufficient countervailing buyer power would prevent
upstream price increases, and so on. As should be evident, the
type of evidence that could rebut the inference of anticompetitive effect would depend on the competitive effects theory that underlies the presumption.
Conclusion
The widely divergent views about enforcement policy that
we noted in our introduction may make it hard for practitioners to counsel clients about vertical mergers or advocate
before the agencies, whether they are supporting or questioning the transaction. Our analysis can be particularly useful for those advocates who may have wrongly supposed that
vertical mergers should or will be presumed to benefit competition. As we have explained, modern economic analysis
does not support a relaxed approach to vertical merger review
and enforcement. For that reason, advocates should address
the full range of potential competitive harms, with reference
to the specific facts of their transaction, and apply the rigorous mainstream modern economic thinking that we have
relied upon. For the same reason, advocates should analyze
carefully the magnitude of claimed efficiencies, their mergerspecificity, and the likelihood that they would reverse the
potential anticompetitive effect.
We are also writing for the enforcement agencies, by setting forth our views on critical issues regarding vertical merger enforcement policy that the Commission must address in
any hearings report and the agencies must resolve in formulating revised vertical merger guidelines. We have recommended these five principles to anchor effective vertical merger enforcement by reducing false negatives while keeping
false positives low. We hope that the agencies will agree and
follow our recommendations even before they release new
vertical merger guidelines. These recommendations also
could be useful if the Congress decides to amend Section 7
of the Clayton Act. 䡵

181-0180 (Jan. 28, 2019) (Dissenting Statement of Comm’r Rebecca Kelly
Slaughter) [hereinafter Commissioner Slaughter Staples Statement];
Staples, Inc., FTC No. 181-0180 (Jan. 28, 2019) (Dissenting Statement
of Comm’r Rohit Chopra) [hereinafter Commissioner Chopra Staples
Statement].
5

Fresenius Medical Care AG, FTC No. 171- 0227 (Feb. 19, 2019) (Decision
and Order). Fresenius Medical Care AG, FTC No. 171-0227 (Feb. 19, 2019)
(Statement of Chairman Joseph J. Simons, Comm’r Noah Joshua Phillips,
and Comm’r Christine S. Wilson) [hereinafter Fresenius Majority Statement];
Fresenius Medical Care AG, FTC No. 171-0227 (Feb. 19, 2019) (Dissenting
Statement of Comm’r Slaughter) [hereinafter Fresenius Slaughter Statement]; Fresenius Medical Care AG, FTC No. 171-0227 (Feb. 19, 2019) (Dissenting Statement of Comm’r Chopra) [hereinafter Fresenius Chopra
Statement].
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Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Vertical Merger Policy:
What Do We Know and Where Do We Go? Keynote Address at the GCR Live
8th Annual Antitrust Law Leaders Forum (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.
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No. 18-5214 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 13, 2018) (No. 18-5214) [hereinafter 27
Scholars]; Corrected Proof Brief of Amici Professor William P. Rogerson and
American Cable Association in Support of Appellant, United States v. AT&T,
No. 18-5214 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 21, 2018); Brief Amici Curiae of 37
Economists, Antitrust Scholars, and Former Government Antitrust Officials
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